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Probability, Hyperreals, Asymptotic Density, and God’s Lottery

Abstract: Consider a subset, S, of the positive integers. What is the probability of selecting a number in S, assuming that each positive integer has an equal chance of selection? The purpose of this short paper is to provide an answer to this question. I also suggest that the answer allows us to determine the relative sizes of two subsets of the positive integers.

In ‘God’s lottery’, Storrs McCall and D.M. Armstrong (henceforth, the authors) consider a lottery in which a winning number is drawn from the set of all positive integers, where each has an equal chance of selection. The authors consider choices between different sets of lottery tickets. One of the themes of their paper is that there is a tension between (what I will call) a Cantorian approach to the problem and a Euclidean one. On the Cantorian approach: i) any finite set of tickets, having measure 0, has no chance of selection, and ii) two infinite sets of tickets that have a bijection between them have the same chance of selection. On a Euclidean approach, if S is a proper subset of T, then a ticket from S has a smaller chance of selection than a ticket from T. The purpose of this paper is to present an approach to God’s lottery that is Euclidean; to do so, I assign probabilities to events (subsets of the positive integers). Of course, this probability measure is merely finitely additive and not countably additive. After presenting the probability measure, I apply it to the examples that the authors consider. I then suggest that the Euclidean approach is preferable to the Cantorian approach.
And so we are concerned with the following problem: Given a subset of the positive integers, S, what is the probability, P(S), that the lottery ticket drawn will be in S? I suggest that we can answer this question by building a hyperreal number, which is a sequence of real numbers.​[1]​ Each term of the sequence is a fraction. Denominators are 1, 2, 3, 4…. Each numerator is the number of positive integers less than or equal to the denominator that are in S. For example, the probability that God selects 1, 2, or 3 is [<1/1, 2/2, 3/3, 3/4, 3/5, 3/6, 3/7,…>]. This hyperreal number, call it ε, is an infinitesimal. The probability that God selects a number greater than 3 is [<0/1, 0/2, 0/3, 1/4, 2/5, 3/6, 4/7,…>]. This number is infinitesimally close to, but less than, 1. It is 1 – ε. The probability of selecting an odd number is P(ODD) = [<1/1, 1/2, 2/3, 2/4, 3/5, 3/6,…>]. The probability of selecting an even number is P(EVEN) = [<0/1, 1/2, 1/3, 2/4, 2/5, 3/6,…>]. The probability of selecting a positive integer is 1. The probability of selecting no positive integer is 0. 
To my knowledge, such a probability measure is new and worth consideration.​[2]​ It allows us to determine, for any two subsets of the positive integers S and T, which is larger. Namely, a set of tickets T is larger than set S iff P(T) > P(S), with P the probability measure defined above. This sense of larger is not Cantorian, on which any two countable sets are the same size (have the same cardinality), rather it is a Euclidean sense of size. Armed with this probability measure, let us go through the authors’ original examples. (1) we prefer tickets numbered 101 to 1,000,000 to tickets numbered 1 to 100, (2) we prefer even-numbered tickets to tickets that are multiples of 3, (3) we prefer multiples of 3 to multiples of 47,198, (4) we prefer multiples of 47,198 to all numbers less than 10^10^10, and (5) we prefer multiples of 3 to multiples of 6.
Why is such a Euclidean approach preferable to a Cantorian one? First, simply because a set has measure 0, there remains the intuition that a number could be selected from the set. The Euclidean approach matches this intuition by assigning a positive infinitesimal probability to non-empty sets of positive integers. Second, the Euclidean approach matches the intuition that we should prefer a set over any of its proper subsets, e.g., we should prefer the numbers from 1 to 100 to the numbers from 1 to 10. More importantly (now moving away from sets of measure 0) in the authors’ example (5), the multiples of 3 should be preferable to the multiples of 6. Based on these considerations, the Euclidean approach is preferable to the Cantorian.
	A potential problem with the Euclidean approach comes from rearrangement. In example (2), the authors (McCall and Armstrong 1989: 223) note that the tickets might be rearranged so that the multiples of 3 would appear preferable to the evens, for example if the positive integers were rearranged:

1, 3, 6, 2, 9, 12, 4, 15, 18, 5, 21, 24,…

But the Euclidean approach rejects such rearrangement. This is not the place for a detailed discussion of this point. But see Mancosu (2009: 637-639) and Parker (2009: 106-107) for a discussion of the rejection of rearrangement. Bartha (2004: 310-315) also rejects rearrangement in a slightly different context.
A second potential problem, or at least an oddity, is that whether there are more odds than evens depends on the ultrafilter used to construct the hyperreals. Note that these numbers, P(ODD) and P(EVEN), either both equal 1/2 if the evens are in the ultrafilter, or they each differ from 1/2 by an infinitesimal if the odds are in the ultrafilter, as P(ODD) – 1/2 = [<1/2, 0, 1/6, 0, 1/10, 0,…>]; P(EVEN) – 1/2 = –[<1/2, 0, 1/6, 0, 1/10, 0,…>].​[3]​ 
In this paragraph, I note that a sufficient (but not necessary) condition that would lead us to expect both of these potential problems is if some suitably strong form of finitism were true, one on which there were only finitely many finite positive integers. First, rearrangement would fail as there really would be more, e.g., multiples of 2 than multiples of 3. Second, an odd would be more likely to be selected than an even if there were an odd number of finite positive integers. If, on the other hand, there were an even number of positive integers, then P(ODD) = P(EVEN). That is, the truth of such a form of finitism would lead us to expect both the failure of rearrangement and the possible difference of P(ODD) and P(EVEN). I merely note this point, and do not suggest that it provides evidence for any version of finitism.
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^1	  See, e.g., Goldblatt (1998) for a development of such hyperreals.
^2	  The probability measure is essentially asymptotic density inserted into a hyperreal.
^3	  Mancosu (2009: 635-636) noted this occurrence in a similar context.
